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The Conscientious Legislator and Public Opinion on 
Taxes 
By Lawrence Zelenak* 
If a conscientious legislator desired to enact the tax policy 
preferences of the general public (as indicated by public opinion 
polling), she would have to start, of course, by identifying those 
preferences.  Unfortunately, on a number of important tax policy 
questions, public opinion is difficult to discern; on some issues, public 
opinion even appears to contradict itself.  This article examines some of 
the difficulties of understanding public opinion on taxes and offers 
some suggestions as to how the conscientious legislator might proceed 
in light of those difficulties.  Part I describes two contexts in which 
public opinion appears to contradict itself and suggests how the 
apparent contradictions might be resolved.  Part II offers three 
suggestions for the conscientious legislator whose goal is to discern, 
rather than to manipulate, public opinion on taxes—to be neither unduly 
optimistic nor despairing about the potential for educating the public on 
tax policy issues, to understand and guard against the manipulation of 
public opinion by those with particular tax policy agendas, and to be 
guided by opinion surveys that give the public a range of policy options 
rather than forcing a choice between two polar positions.  Part III briefly 
concludes. 
I.  TWO EXAMPLES OF THE DIFFICULTY OF DISCERNING PUBLIC OPINION 
ON TAX POLICY 
This section considers two examples of the difficulty of discerning 
public opinion on tax policy issues and in each case proposes a strategy 
for overcoming the difficulty.  In the first case, the proposed solution 
seems simple and workable; in the second case, the problem seems less 
tractable, and the proposed solution may or may not succeed. 
 
* Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
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A.  The Highest Rate of Tax Anyone Should Be Required to Pay 
Accepting the Republican Party’s presidential nomination in 2000, 
George W. Bush declared, “On principle no one in America should have 
to pay a, [sic] more than a third of their income to the federal 
government.”1  Although the source of such a principle is not self-
evident and Bush offered no analysis in support of his claim, polling 
suggests that Bush’s proposed ceiling is, if anything, too high to satisfy 
public opinion. 
A 1995 Roper Center/Reader’s Digest poll, for example, asked, 
“What’s the highest amount, highest percentage you think would be fair 
for any family of four to pay in all their taxes combined, no matter how 
high their income?”2  The mean response was 23%, and the median 
response was 20%.3  An earlier national survey, conducted by Peggy A. 
Hite and Michael Roberts, asked respondents for the “highest marginal 
rate of tax [married taxpayers] should have to pay . . . no matter how 
much [their] income.”4  The mean response was 27.97%.5  It is doubtful 
whether most respondents understood the distinction between average 
rates and marginal rates, but to the extent respondents were thinking in 
terms of marginal rates, their ceiling for average rates presumably 
would have been somewhat lower.6 
Other surveys have asked for “the highest percentage anybody should 
have to pay” with respect to “all taxes, state, federal, and local.”7  
Although asking the question with respect to “anybody” implies the 
qualification, “no matter how high their income,” it is not surprising that 
the failure to make the qualification explicit results in lower preferred 
rates, with both means and medians well below 20%.8  Still other 
 
1. George W. Bush, Republican Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech (Aug. 3, 2000), 
in The Republicans; Bush Outlines His Goals: ‘I Want to Change the Tone of Washington,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2000, at A24. 
2. KARLYN BOWMAN, AMER. ENTER. INST., PUBLIC OPINION ON TAXES 28 (2008) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050415_TAXES.pdf. 
3. Id. 
4. Peggy A. Hite & Michael L. Roberts, An Experimental Investigation of Taxpayer 
Judgments on Rate Structure in the Individual Income Tax System, 13 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 47, 
55 (1991) (emphasis added). 
5. Id. 
6. A taxpayer's average rate of tax is her tax liability as a percentage of her taxable income.  A 
taxpayer's marginal rate of tax is the rate that applies to her last dollar of income.  In a tax system 
with a graduated rate structure, a taxpayer subject to more than one rate bracket will have a higher 
marginal rate than average rate. 
7. BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 28 (reporting results of Fox News/Opinion Dynamics polls 
conducted in 1999, 2001, and 2003) (emphasis added). 
8. Id.  In 1999, the mean was 15% and the median 10%; in 2001, 17% and 15%; and in 2003, 
17% and 10%.  Id. 
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surveys omit even the reference to “anybody” and simply ask for the 
“maximum percentage of a person’s income that should go to taxes – 
that is, all taxes, state, federal and local.”9  Although this calls even less 
attention to the highest income taxpayers than the “anybody” 
formulation, the mean responses—in the mid-teens—are quite similar to 
the mean responses to the “anybody” questions.10  In the case of the “a 
person” questions, and perhaps in the case of the “anybody” questions 
as well, there is reason to suspect that many respondents interpret the 
questions to ask about the highest rate of tax the respondents themselves 
should have to pay—in other words, a respondent may think of himself 
as the “person” referred to in the question.  This is suggested by the way 
in which the mean responses are higher for respondents in higher 
income groups.  In a 2007 survey, for example, the mean was 13.2% for 
respondents with incomes of $25,000 to $35,000, but 17.5% for 
respondents with incomes of $75,000 or more.11 
Even in the case of the questions of the “no matter how high their 
income” variety, respondents seem to suffer from a certain failure of 
imagination concerning how high the highest income might be.  This is 
strongly suggested by within-survey inconsistencies between responses 
to “no matter how high their income” questions, and responses to 
questions that ask respondents to assign appropriate tax burdens to 
taxpayers at various specified income levels.  In the same 1995 survey 
that produced a mean maximum tax burden of 23% and a median of 
20%, “no matter how high their income,” a question asking for “the 
highest percentage you think would be fair for a family making 
$200,000 a year to pay when you add their taxes together” produced a 
mean of 27% and a median of 25%.12  The Hite and Roberts survey that 
produced a mean highest marginal tax rate of 27.97% for married 
taxpayers, “[n]o matter how much income [they] have,” also asked 
respondents to assign average tax rates to married couples at various 
income levels, “so that every household is paying its ‘fair share.’”13  At 
 
9. ANDREW CHAMBERLAIN, TAX FOUNDATION SPECIAL REPORT NO. 154, WHAT DOES 
AMERICA THINK ABOUT TAXES? 8 (2007), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/ 
files/sr154.pdf. 
10. The mean response was 16% in 2005, 15% in 2006, and 14.7% in 2007.  Id.  In addition to 
the “a person” question quoted in the text, the 2005 survey also asked, “Out of every dollar 
what’s the highest percentage anybody SHOULD HAVE TO PAY in taxes?”  BILL DALBEC & 
AMIE WANG, TAX FOUNDATION, ATTITUDES ON TAX AND WEALTH ISSUES – TOPLINE RESULTS 
5 (2005).  The mean response of 16% was the same as the 2005 mean response to the “anybody” 
question.  Id. 
11. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 9, at 3. 
12. BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 28. 
13. Hite & Roberts, supra note 4, at 55. 
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$100,000 family income (the highest income level specified), the mean 
average tax rate was 29.16%.14 
In both surveys, asking respondents to imagine a specific income 
amount—high, but far from stratospheric—produced higher maximum 
tax rates than asking a “no matter how high” question mentioning no 
specific income amounts.  As far as I have been able to discover, no 
survey has ever asked about the maximum fair tax burden for any 
specified dollar amount of income above $200,000.  Given the strong 
evidence that questions of the “no matter how high” and “anybody” 
varieties do not prompt respondents to think about taxpayers with very 
high incomes, we simply do not know what the public thinks should be 
the maximum average tax rate for a taxpayer with income of 
$1,000,000, $10,000,000, or $100,000,000.  There is good reason to 
suspect, however, that it is considerably higher than any of the mean 
responses to the questions that have been asked and perhaps higher than 
Bush’s one-third principle as well.  In the case of polls commissioned 
by organizations with low-tax agendas, the failure to ask about average 
rates for specified very high income levels may be intentional.  Such 
organizations may understand that the responses to questions phrased in 
terms of “no matter how high their income,” “anybody,” or “a person,” 
can plausibly be used as evidence of public opinion on the appropriate 
tax rates for billionaires, and they may suspect that more specific dollar-
based questions would produce results less congenial to their policy 
agendas.  However, organizations with different policy agendas and 
pollsters with no policy agendas should recognize the failure of 
imagination reflected in the responses to questions that do not specify 
income levels, and they should address that failure by devising new 
questions focused on income levels far higher than the low six figures. 
B.  The “Metric Effect”: Tax Dollars Versus Tax Rates 
Opinions as to appropriate tax burdens at different income levels are 
highly sensitive to whether the question is asked in terms of percentages 
or dollars.  In a study by Roberts and Hite, the average preferred 
effective tax rate on $100,000 income was about 29% (corresponding, 
of course, to a tax burden of about $29,000); when a substantively 
identical question was asked in terms of dollars rather than percentages, 
however, the average preferred tax burden was only $20,000.15  A more 
recent study by Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron produced 
 
14. Id. 
15. Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Compliance, 16 
L. & POL’Y 27, 32–33 (1994). 
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similar results.16  This “framing effect” or “metric effect” makes a 
significant difference in desired levels of tax progressivity; public 
opinion supports much greater average rate progressivity when 
questions are framed in percentage terms than when questions are 
framed in dollar terms.17 
Assuming Congress would like to distribute the tax burden in 
accordance with public preferences as expressed in opinion polling, 
how could it do so in light of these inconsistent preferences?  One 
possibility would be to rely on intuition about which frame—
percentages or dollars—is likely to produce the more authentic 
preferences.  Unfortunately, intuitions on this question tend to differ.  
Commenting on their results, Roberts and Hite opine that the answers to 
the dollar question are more reliable, because people tend to confuse 
average tax rates with marginal tax rates, while “[b]y comparison, 
assessments in dollar terms are unambiguous and therefore are more 
valid.”18  In contrast, McCaffery and Baron describe the responses to 
the dollar questions as being based on a “progressivity illusion” (i.e., the 
illusion that a tax is progressive if it imposes dollar burdens which 
increase with income, even if the burdens represent flat or decreasing 
percentages of income as income rises), thus implying that the answers 
to the percentage questions reveal the respondents’ true preferences.19 
Neither view is entirely persuasive.  When Hite and Roberts reject the 
rate-based (as contrasted with dollar-based) questions on grounds of 
confusion between average rates and marginal rates, their concern is 
that respondents may be answering in terms of marginal rates when the 
question is asking them to answer in terms of average rates.  If so, and if 
desired marginal rates are higher than desired average rates (as one 
would expect), rate-based questions will produce higher average rates 
than respondents actually desire.  Although this is possible, it seems 
unlikely.  The concept of marginal tax rates is almost certainly more 
difficult for the public to grasp than the concept of average tax rates.  If 
that is right, people might well think in terms of average rates when 
they are asked to think in terms of marginal rates, but they would not be 
 
16. Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1755–57 (2005) (stating that at $100,000 income, the mean preferred 
average tax rate was 18.8%, but the mean preferred tax burden in dollars was only $15,200; at 
$200,000 income the mean preferred average tax rate was 24.6%, but the mean preferred tax 
burden in dollars was only $16,800). 
17. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 16, at 1757 tbl.B; Roberts & Hite, supra note 15, at 33 
fig.1. 
18. Roberts & Hite, supra note 15, at 42. 
19. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 16, at 1755.  They do not mention the contrary view of 
Roberts and Hite.  See id. 
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likely to think in terms of marginal rates when asked to think in terms of 
average rates.  When McCaffery and Baron claim that the answers to 
dollar-based questions are influenced by a “progressivity illusion,” they 
are implicitly claiming that the public’s true preference is for 
progressive average tax rates, but that the public mistakenly believes 
that average rate progressivity results as long as dollars of tax liability 
increase with income (even if the increase is only proportional to 
income, or less than proportional to income).  They do not consider, 
however, an alternative hypothesis which seems equally plausible: that 
the public’s true preference is simply that dollars of tax liability increase 
significantly with income, but that the public mistakenly believes that 
achieving that result requires progressive average tax rates. 
It is far from clear that either frame—dollars or percentages—is more 
revealing of true preferences than the other.  A possible approach to 
resolving the inconsistency would be to ask the same respondents 
substantively identical questions using first one frame and then the 
other, with enough time separation between the two questions to 
weaken or eliminate the influence of the answer to the first question on 
the answer to the second.  (The questions could be asked in one order 
for one set of subjects, and in the opposite order for another set.)  If a 
subject’s answers under the two frames were not consistent, the 
questioner would point out the inconsistency and ask the subject for his 
true preferences in light of the inconsistency.  This would be a 
considerably more complicated process than the typical tax opinion 
survey, but it is the most promising route for resolving the inconsistent 
responses to dollar-based and rate-based questions—certainly more 
promising than attempting to choose between the competing intuitions 
of Roberts and Hite, and McCaffery and Baron. 
II.  LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD DISCERN RATHER THAN 
MANIPULATE PUBLIC OPINION 
This section offers three suggestions for the conscientious legislator 
who wishes to discern—rather than manipulate—public opinion on tax 
policy issues.  The suggestions are: (1) be realistic, but not despairing, 
about the role education can play in informing public opinion; (2) 
understand how those with particular tax policy agendas can manipulate 
public opinion and how that manipulation can be countered; and (3) 
seek out public opinion on a range of policy options, rather than 
requiring the public to choose between two policy extremes. 
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 A.  Difficult Tax Concepts and the Role of Education 
Part of the problem in discerning public opinion on tax issues may be 
that some tax policy concepts are too difficult for most of the public to 
grasp.  There is evidence, for example, that “even relatively 
sophisticated individuals do not really understand [the concept of tax] 
incidence,”  the idea that the economic burden of a tax may fall partly or 
entirely on someone other than the nominal taxpayer.20  Similarly, there 
is good reason to suspect that the concept of progressive effective tax 
rates may be beyond the grasp of most of the public.  In one study, the 
results of which are rather shocking, investigators asked a group of 
undergraduate students who had just completed either an introductory or 
an advanced tax class at one of two large public American universities 
to indicate whether various tax systems were progressive, flat, or 
regressive.  One of the tax systems was described as imposing a tax of 
$5,000 on a taxpayer with an income of $60,000, and a tax of $3,000 on 
a taxpayer with an income of $30,000.  Despite the fact that the 
effective tax rate on the higher-income taxpayer was 8.3% and the 
effective tax rate on the lower-income taxpayer was 10%, 57.5% (107 
out of 186) of the students identified the tax system as progressive.21 
Some have argued that education is the solution to the problem of 
poorly informed public opinion on tax issues, but these results suggest 
that there are limits to what education can achieve.  On the other hand, 
it is too early to give up.  On at least some issues, the educational 
approach appears promising.  The choice between the Hall-Rabushka-
Forbes flat tax and the current income tax provides an example.22  
During the high point of public interest in replacing the income tax with 
the flat tax, a number of polls indicated the public narrowly preferred 
the flat tax to the income tax.  In a 2002 poll, for example, 53% of those 
expressing an opinion favored replacing the income tax with the flat 
tax.23 
Using other data from the same survey, Joel Slemrod was able to 
determine that a substantial amount of the support for the flat tax was 
based on the widespread misconception that the current income tax is 
 
20. Steven M. Sheffrin, What Does the Public Believe About Tax Fairness?, 46 NAT’L TAX J. 
301, 306 (1993). 
21. See Michael L. Roberts, Peggy A. Hite & Cassie F. Bradley, Understanding Attitudes 
Toward Progressive Taxation, 58 PUB. OPINION Q. 165, 172, 176, 178, 180, 183 (1994) (author’s 
calculations, based on tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
22. See generally ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995) 
(discussing the flat tax proposal). 
23. See NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & KENNEDY SCHOOL OF 
GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON TAXES 8 (question 25) (2003). 
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regressive, so that a switch to the flat tax would be a progressive 
change.24  He concluded that “completely eliminating the 
misconceptions would reduce the percentage favoring a flat tax by 
10.3[%] . . . from 52.9[%] to 42.6[%].”25  Correcting this misconception 
would require only the conveyance of fairly simple and straightforward 
information.  This task seems feasible in a way that explaining tax 
incidence or progressivity to the general public does not.  The task has 
not been made easier, however, by the fact that in recent years the 
income tax has actually become regressive at the very top of the income 
distribution, as a result of the extensive impact of the favorable rates on 
capital gains and dividends on the tax liabilities of the wealthiest 
taxpayers.  In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available, 
the average federal income tax rate for taxpayers with adjusted gross 
incomes (AGIs) of one million dollars or more (23.0%) was almost one 
percentage point lower than the average rate for taxpayers with AGIs in 
the $500,000 to one million dollar range (23.9%).26  Additionally, the 
2005 average tax rate on the 400 highest income taxpayers—the so-
called “Fortunate 400”—was a mere 18.23%.27  In addition to the 
obvious immediate benefit to wealthy taxpayers of highly preferential 
rates for capital gains and dividends, the high-end regressivity produced 
by those rates may help make the case for the flat tax with the general 
public.28 
 
24. Joel Slemrod, The Role of Misconceptions in Support for Regressive Tax Reform, 59 
NAT’L TAX J. 57, 57 (2006). 
25. Id. at 66. 
26. Kyle Mudry & Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares, 2005, in STAT. OF 
INCOME BULL., Winter 2008, at 8, 11 fig.B. 
27. Tom Herman, There’s Rich, and There’s the ‘Fortunate 400,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008, 
at D1. 
28. To the extent the public desires progressivity and the current income tax is not progressive 
throughout its entire range, it would seem more rational to eliminate the regressive aspects of the 
current system than to adopt some form of flat tax (thus abandoning the progressivity goal in 
despair).  It is not clear, however, that the majority of the general public would agree.  In this 
regard, it is interesting to note the strangely populist flavor of Mike Huckabee’s support for 
replacing the federal income tax with a national sales tax.  At times during his campaign for the 
Republican presidential nomination, Huckabee seemed to be arguing that the appropriate policy 
response to the inequity produced by the avoidance or evasion of tax on some investment income 
by some wealthy taxpayers would be to amend the law so that no wealthy taxpayer would owe tax 
on any investment income.  In one debate, for example, he made the following case for replacing 
the income tax with a sales tax: 
[Rich] people . . . can take their money, shelter it at maybe 15 percent income, not the 
35 percent that the self-employed people in the country pay, or they can hide it away in 
a Cayman Island offshore bank account and pay no tax on it.  The average American is 
going to resent the fact that there is not a level of equity in the tax system. 
Fox News: Republican Forum (Fox television broadcast Jan. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15179/republican_forum_transcript_fox_news.html. 
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The work of James S. Fishkin suggests an interesting approach to the 
education problem: thoroughly educating a small number of people, 
whose views might then be taken as an indication of what the general 
public would think if it were similarly educated.  Fishkin has pioneered 
the concept of the “deliberative poll,” under which a group of people 
selected using the usual selection principles of opinion polling are 
brought together for a weekend of non-partisan education and 
discussion on a number of public policy issues.29  They are polled on 
the issues before the education begins and again at the end of the 
weekend.  Fishkin urges policymakers to give substantial weight to the 
results of such deliberative polls, on the grounds that they represent 
genuinely informed public opinion—what the general public would 
think if it had been exposed to the education received by the polled 
group.  There are obvious concerns about the quality and neutrality of 
the weekend’s education, and about the extent to which policymakers 
and the general public would accept the legitimacy of the results of 
deliberative polls, but Fishkin’s approach is nevertheless intriguing.  As 
it happens, the flat tax was one of the topics Fishkin included in his first 
American deliberative poll, held in Austin, Texas, in 1996.  Support for 
the flat tax fell from 44% at the beginning of the weekend to 30% at the 
end.30  At least on this important tax policy issue, education—either of 
the general public or of a deliberative polling group serving as a 
surrogate for the general public—does seem to produce better-informed 
opinions, which can serve as a better guide for the conscientious 
legislator. 
B.  The Problem of Opinion Manipulation 
A public, poorly informed on tax policy issues, can be exploited by a 
poll commissioned by a group with a particular policy agenda.  For 
example, in recent years, the Tax Foundation, an organization which 
somewhat dubiously describes itself as non-partisan, has commissioned 
annual polls on various tax policy questions, including the following: 
Last year 43.4 million Americans–that’s one-third of all taxpayers–
paid no federal income tax after deductions and credits.  Thinking 
about your own tax burden, do you think this is fair, or do you feel 
everyone should be required to pay some minimum amount of tax to 
help fund government?31 
 
29. JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY 
(1997). 
30. Id. at 214. 
31. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 9, at 11. 
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With the question presented in those terms, it is hardly surprising that 
the majority of those polled, 61%, thought this was not fair.  This result 
fits neatly with the Tax Foundation’s goal of increasing the percentage 
of Americans with positive federal income tax liabilities.  Scott A. 
Hodge, the Tax Foundation’s President, has claimed: 
While some may applaud the fact that millions of low- and middle-
income families pay no income taxes, there is a threat to the fabric of 
our democracy when so many Americans are not only disconnected 
from the cost of government but are net consumers of government 
benefits.  The conditions are ripe for social conflict if these voters 
begin to demand more government benefits because they know others 
will bear the costs.32 
A question designed to educate, rather than to take advantage of 
ignorance, might have explained that in many cases the absence of an 
income tax liability is the result of the earned income tax credit (EITC), 
which plays an important role in lifting low-wage working families 
above the poverty level.  Such a question might also have informed (or 
reminded) respondents that those who pay no income tax often pay 
substantial federal payroll tax, federal excise taxes, various state and 
local taxes, and in many cases have paid and will pay substantial federal 
income tax in other years.  Using simulations based on a simplified 
model of 2003 federal income tax law and inflation-adjusted earnings 
data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, Lily L. Batchelder, 
Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., and Peter R. Orszag have estimated that “about 
three-quarters of tax units who would be eligible for the refundable 
element of the EITC or CTC [child tax credit] at some point during a 
twenty-year period under current law should nevertheless have positive 
net federal income tax liability over that period if historic earnings 
patterns are any guide.”33  When they broaden their analysis to include 
the employer and employee portions of the federal payroll tax, in 
addition to the federal income tax, they estimate that over 99% of those 
eligible for the refundable element of the EITC or CTC for at least one 
 
32. SCOTT A. HODGE, PUTTING A FACE ON AMERICA’S TAX RETURNS: SOUND TAX REFORM 
MUST BEGIN WITH A SOLID UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICAN 
TAXPAYERS 8–9 (2005), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/ 
dba37618d9c2d2df02f24766ac4cc39d.pdf.  Concern over an excessive number of Americans 
without positive federal income tax liabilities is a frequent theme in Tax Foundation publications.  
See, e.g., Scott A. Hodge, Number of Americans Paying Zero Federal Income Tax Grows to 43.4 
Million, FISCAL FACTS, Mar. 30, 2006, available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/ 
show/1410.html; J. Scott Moody & Scott A. Hodge, The Growing Class of Americans Who Pay 
No Federal Income Taxes, FISCAL FACTS, Apr. 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/206.html.  
33. Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax 
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 68 (2006). 
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year of a twenty-year period should have a positive federal tax liability 
over those twenty years.34 
Of course, a question which included any information of this sort 
might not have produced the answers desired by the Tax Foundation.  In 
fact, less leading versions of the same basic question, asked in prior 
decades, have produced results which would not be congenial to the Tax 
Foundation.  A 1986 Roper/H&R Block survey asked: “As a matter of 
public policy, do you think that everyone who receives an income 
should pay SOME tax–even if it’s only one dollar–or do you think that 
people below the poverty level should not have to pay any tax?”35  The 
no-tax option was the choice of 59% of respondents; only 39% wanted 
to impose the tax on everyone.36  When the same question had been 
asked in 1979, the results were similar—56% opposed tax on the poor, 
while 41% favored it.37  The only effective response to questions such 
as the Tax Foundation’s question, by those who are trying to discover 
true public opinion rather than take advantage of a poorly-informed 
public, is to commission their own polls using questions designed to 
educate rather than to obfuscate. 
C.  The Importance of Providing a Range of Policy Options 
Perhaps the most important lesson for those interested in trying to 
discern rather than manipulate public opinion is that polls must present 
the public with a range of policy options, rather than merely with two 
extremes.  Two recent stories of public opinion and the tax legislative 
process illustrate this point. 
The first story is about the attempt to repeal the estate tax (which has 
resulted, so far, in the repeal of the estate tax for the single year 201038).  
When polls taken in the early years of the current decade simply asked 
whether or not one favored repealing the estate tax, substantial 
majorities consistently supported repeal.  In the 2002 National Election 
Survey, for example, 67.8% of those polled favored “doing away with 
the estate tax.”39  Interestingly, and perhaps contrary to conventional 
 
34. Id. 
35. ROPER/H&R BLOCK STUDY #1986-0643: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE AMERICAN 
INCOME TAX SYSTEM 16 (question 15) (1986). 
36. Id. 
37. ROPER H&R BLOCK STUDY #1979-0673: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE INCOME TAX 
SYSTEM: THE THIRD IN A SERIES OF STUDIES 21 (question 22) (1979). 
38. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115 
Stat. 69 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
39. Mayling Birney, Michael J. Graetz & Ian Shapiro, Public Opinion and the Push to Repeal 
the Estate Tax, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 439, 444 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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wisdom, purely rhetorical differences in the wording of the question 
made little difference in the results.  In the same survey, some 
respondents were asked about “doing away with the death tax” rather 
than about “doing away with the estate tax”; this increased the 
percentage in favor of repeal only modestly, from 67.8% to 70.0%.40  
What made a major difference, however, was offering respondents 
intermediate options between repeal and the status quo.41  A 2002 poll, 
for example, found a slight public preference for retaining the estate tax 
and raising the exemption level to $3 million rather than simply 
repealing the tax (by a margin of 47% to 42%).42  Another poll found 
only 26% of respondents preferred outright repeal to increasing the 
exemption level to $25 million.43  Polls also suggested that the public 
enthusiasm for estate tax repeal would weaken if the public were 
presented with a choice between estate tax repeal and an equal-size 
income tax cut focused on the middle class.44  More generally, support 
for estate tax repeal is likely to drop in any poll which makes the crucial 
point that estate tax repeal is not free.  In a period of budget deficits, 
estate tax repeal implies some combination of increased deficits, 
decreased government spending, and increases in other taxes. 
The story of public opinion and the 2001 and 2003 Bush income tax 
cuts is similar to the estate tax story.  Despite the heavy skewing of 
those tax cuts in favor of the rich in terms of dollars of tax cuts per 
taxpayer, opinion polling consistently found modest majorities in favor 
of the cuts when questions simply asked respondents to choose between 
the Bush cuts and no cuts.  In his analysis of those polls, Larry Bartels 
concludes that these majorities were dependent on the existence of a 
sizeable group of taxpayers who would support any package of tax cuts, 
no matter how skewed in favor of the rich, as long as the package 
included some tax reduction—however modest—for the taxpayers 
themselves.45  Proponents of the cuts were able to claim public support 
for the cuts precisely because most polling simply pitted the Bush cuts 
against the status quo.  As Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson have 
demonstrated, however, polling which pitted the Bush tax cuts against 
equal-revenue tax cuts less skewed in favor of the rich indicated a 
 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., id. at 448. 
42. Id. at 447–48. 
43. Id. at 443 (discussing 2003 NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy poll). 
44. Id. at 447. 
45. Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American 
Mind, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 15 (2005); see also Larry M. Bartels, A Tale of Two Tax Cuts, a Wage 
Squeeze, and a Tax Credit, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 403 (2006). 
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strong public preference for the alternative tax cuts.46  One poll, for 
example, found the public preferred—by a margin of fifty-three 
percentage points—that the tax cut plan be “adjusted so more of the tax 
cuts went to lower-income taxpayers.”47  And when the public was 
asked to evaluate tax cuts relative to other possible uses of the expected 
federal budget surpluses, respondents strongly preferred foregoing the 
tax cuts and using the surpluses to strengthen Social Security (preferred 
over tax cuts by a margin of 74% to 21%) or to shore up Medicare 
(preferred over tax cuts by a margin of 65% to 25%).48  In short, public 
opinion supported the Bush tax cuts only because most polling 
presented the public with an impoverished range of policy options. 
Bartels engaged in a rather sharp debate with Hacker and Pierson, in 
a 2005 issue of Perspectives on Politics, concerning whether the public 
really supported the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.49  The debate was not 
about the actual contours of public opinion regarding the tax cuts—as to 
which the two sides largely agreed—but rather about the descriptive 
label (supportive or unsupportive) that should be attached to those 
contours.  According to Hacker and Pierson, the 2001 tax cut was 
“directly at odds with majority views,”50 despite substantial polling 
majorities in favor of the cut: 
[T]hese polls say almost nothing about what kind of tax cuts the 
public wanted and how much priority they gave them.  In fact, by 
isolating the issue of tax cuts from any discussion of alternatives or 
tradeoffs, the polls fail completely to capture public opinion about 
policy priorities.51 
Bartels, however, argued that the position of Hacker and Pierson 
reflected “a fundamental confusion about the nature of democracy.”52  
According to Bartels, 
Democratic policy agendas are set by elected leaders, not by voters.  
As E. E. Schattschneider aptly put it, “The people are a sovereign 
whose vocabulary is limited to two words, ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’” In the 
case of the tax cuts, President Bush posed the question and the 
 
46. Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the 
Limits of Democratic Control, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 33 (2005). 
47. Id. at 38. 
48. Id. 
49. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, supra 
note 45, at 21. 
50. Hacker & Pierson, supra note 46, at 34. 
51. Id. at 37. 
52. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, supra 
note 45, at 21. 
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people’s response, insofar as they responded at all, was a vigorous 
“Yes.”53 
As important as this debate may be from the perspective of political 
scientists, it seems beside the point from the perspective of a 
conscientious legislator—an “elected leader” able to participate in the 
setting of “democratic policy agendas”—attempting to discern public 
opinion on matters of tax policy.  Suppose elected leaders presented the 
public with a meaningful range of policy options, and opinion polling 
investigated public opinion with respect to those options.  (Even if 
Bartels and Schattschneider are correct in claiming that the people can 
answer only “yes” or “no,” the people can certainly be asked more than 
one yes-or-no question.)  In that case, the disagreement between Bartels 
and Hacker and Pierson would disappear, because in responding to (in 
Bartel’s words) “policy agendas . . . set by elected leaders,”54 the people 
would be expressing their preferences among (in the words of Hacker 
and Pierson) “alternatives [and] tradeoffs.”55 
III.  CONCLUSION 
It is possible to create polling majorities seemingly on both sides of 
contentious tax policy issues, by taking advantage—or not—of public 
ignorance and confusion, and by artificially restricting—or not—the 
choices presented to the polled public.  Because of these competing 
majorities, and also because tax legislation generally has rather low 
salience with the voting public (that is, voters do not often vote for or 
against a particular candidate based on his positions on tax issues), 
legislators typically have considerable “running room” on tax 
legislation.56  Often they can choose to support or oppose pending tax 
legislation without much fear of voter reprisal in either case.  In many 
cases, then, public opinion will not greatly constrain a legislator’s vote 
on proposed tax legislation.  Even if she is not constrained, however, a 
conscientious legislator will want to take public opinion into account 
when making her decisions—if the opinion is that of a public well-
informed and presented with a reasonable range of policy options.  
Given the ease with which public opinion on taxes can be manipulated 
by the exploitation of ignorance and the restriction of options, those 
who want to employ public opinion legitimately and effectively in the 
 
53. Id. (quoting E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 52 (1942)). 
54. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, supra 
note 45, at 21. 
55. Hacker & Pierson, supra note 46, at 37. 
56. See Birney, Graetz & Shapiro, supra note 39, at 454–56 (discussing the concept of 
“running room” with respect to tax legislation). 
ZELENAK.DOC 1/14/2009  2:02:11 PM 
2009]      The Conscientious Legislator and Public Opinion on Taxes 383 
tax legislative process are faced with a challenging—but not 
impossible—task. 
 
